# 2AC

## Topicality

### Procurement T

#### 1. We meet- plan creates incentives and secures a market for nuclear energy

#### 2. We meet- paying them is the financial incentive

#### 3. Counter interpretation- financial incentives are disbursement of public funds or contingent commitments

Webb 93

(lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa (Kernaghan, “Thumbs, Fingers, and Pushing on String: Legal Accountability in the Use of Federal Financial Incentives”, 31 Alta. L. Rev. 501 (1993) Hein Online)

In this paper, "financial incentives" are taken to mean disbursements 18 of public funds or contingent commitments to individuals and organizations, intended to encourage, support or induce certain behaviours in accordance with express public policy objectives. They take the form of grants, contributions, repayable contributions, loans, loan guarantees and insurance, subsidies, procurement contracts and tax expenditures.19 Needless to say, the ability of government to achieve desired behaviour may vary with the type of incentive in use: up-front disbursements of funds (such as with contributions and procurement contracts) may put government in a better position to dictate the terms upon which assistance is provided than contingent disbursements such as loan guarantees and insurance. In some cases, the incentive aspects of the funding come from the conditions attached to use of the monies.20 In others, the mere existence of a program providing financial assistance for a particular activity (eg. low interest loans for a nuclear power plant, or a pulp mill) may be taken as government approval of that activity, and in that sense, an incentive to encourage that type of activity has been created.21 Given the wide variety of incentive types, it will not be possible in a paper of this length to provide anything more than a cursory discussion of some of the main incentives used.22 And, needless to say, the comments made herein concerning accountability apply to differing degrees depending upon the type of incentive under consideration.¶ By limiting the definition of financial incentives to initiatives where *public funds are either disbursed or contingently committed*, a large number of regulatory programs with incentive *effects* which exist, but in which no money is forthcoming,23 are excluded from direct examination in this paper. Such programs might be referred to as *indirect* incentives. Through elimination of indirect incentives from the scope of discussion, thedefinition of the incentive instrument becomes both more manageable and more particular. Nevertheless, it is possible that much of the approach taken here may be usefully applied to these types of indirect incentives as well.24 Also excluded from discussion here are social assistance programs such as welfare and *ad hoc* industry bailout initiatives because such programs are not designed primarily to *encourage* behaviours in furtherance of specific public policy objectives. In effect, these programs are assistance, but they are not incentives.

#### Ground- it is grounded in the literature and is the only way to intrinsically keep military affs in the topic which are key to beat states counterplans, and it links much harder to disads

#### Predictability- our evidence has a definitive list and an intent to define, and is supported in the literature

#### Limits- only adds procurement affs to their list, but limits out all indirect incentive effects their allows

#### Education- key to talk about different actors use of energy and how energy’s connection to the military, and no aff makes sense where the government is the consumer

#### Reasonability key to prevent a race to the most limiting definition

## Second T

## Case

### Deployable Soon

#### We could commercialize SMR’s within 5 years

Freed 10

Josh Freed, Director of the Third Way Clean Energy Program, Elizabeth Horwitz, Policy Advisor at Third Way’s Clean Energy Program, Jeremy Ershow, Third Way Clean Energy Program, Sept 2010, Thinking Small On Nuclear Power, http://content.thirdway.org/publications/340/Third\_Way\_Idea\_Brief\_-\_Thinking\_Small\_On\_Nuclear\_Power.pdf

Several U.S. companies are in the advanced stages of developing small reactors that adapt existing technology to produce smaller amounts of baseload electricity.15 These technologies are nearly ready for deployment. Final decisions about design, siting, and regulatory approval could be made within the next five years.16 The federal government can take several steps to help make this possible. First, economic barriers to entry must be lowered. For first movers, costs of licensing, design and regulatory approval will be comparable to those of the larger reactors because existing regulations have not yet been tailored to suit new designs. As the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) gains expertise in evaluating SMRs, and as economies of scale develop, these costs will decrease. Until this happens, the Department of Energy’s new cost-sharing program for near-term licensing and deployment of light water SMRs will help reduce some of the financial impact.17[i] The NRC also needs to continue its commitment to allocate sufficient resources and build the expertise necessary to evaluate and license SMRs in a timely fashion. The Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of Defense (DOD) can also prime the market pump by serving as a buyer of first-of-a-kind technologies. This could include deploying SMRs on DOE-owned sites, many of which are already zoned to support nuclear power plants,18 and appropriate DOD facilities in the United States. DOD, the largest single energy consumer in the U.S., comprises 78% of federal energy use, and is the most significant energy consumer in several metropolitan areas.19 DOE should also work closely with the private sector to develop standardized designs, with the goal of achieving demonstration and licensing within a decade.20 The potential market for SMRs is global. As we note in “Getting Our Share of Clean Energy Trade,” whichever country emerges as the market leader could dominate a good part of the $6 trillion global energy market.21 The U.S. could seize that mantle and all the jobs and exports that come with it. American reactors could be deployed within a decade domestically22 and go global soon after.

#### Current SMR technology is well established- Navy ships

Freed 10

(Josh, Director of the Third Way Clean Energy Program, Elizabeth Horwitz is a Policy Advisor at Third Way’s Clean Energy ¶ Program, Jeremy Ershow was formerly a Policy ¶ Advisor at Third Way, “Thinking Small On Nuclear Power” <http://content.thirdway.org/publications/340/Third_Way_Idea_Brief_-_Thinking_Small_On_Nuclear_Power.pdf>, SEH)

The light water technology that current SMRs use is well-established; ¶ American manufacturers have designed and built small, light water reactors for ¶ 60 years to fuel the Navy’s carriers and submarines.¶ 29¶ While advanced reactor ¶ technology is further off, innovation is necessary to complete the transition to ¶ clean energy. Advanced reactor technologies are promising technologies that ¶ we need to invest in today

### at: exports

#### Cooperation can still be achieved without 123 agreements.

Glasgow, ‘10

[James A., Partner -- Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, 6-28, “International Scope of Small Modular Reactors and Outlook for Advanced Reactor Development International Trade Export Controls and SMRs,” http://www.uxc.com/smr/Library/Export%20Issues/2010%20-%20International%20Scope%20of%20SMRs%20and%20Outlook%20for%20Advanced%20Reactor%20Development.pdf]

• While presence or absence of a 123 Agreement is an important factor, lack of such an Agreement does not prevent the Secretary from issuing a specific authorization • DOE has issued more than a dozen specific authorizations for peaceful nuclear assistance to countries that did not have a §123 Agreement with the U.S., including USSR/Russia • “Much…cooperation can take place in the absence of bilateral 123 Agreements, since it involves the exchange of expertise, lessons learned, and best practices rather than the export of nuclear material or reactor components.” • Testimony by Assistant Secretary of State V. Van Diepen at November 2009 hearing of Senate Foreign Relations Committee

#### Each export license is reviewed case-by-case – the plan’s prolif-resistant tech ensures success

ExportControl.org 2005; OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM http://exportcontrol.org/links/2081c.aspx

Each license application under catch-all controls is reviewed on a case-by-case basis. If the U.S. Government determines that the export poses an unacceptable risk of use in or diversion to a nuclear proliferation activity, or that the export would make a material contribution to a chemical or biological proliferation activity, or a missile project of concern, the license is denied. These controls are consistent with AG, MTCR, and NSG catch-all requirements.

### Microgrids

#### Microgrids don’t solve- turn off the renewables during outages

Sater 11

(Daniel, Research Fellow at Global Green USA’s Security and Sustainability Office in ¶ Washington, DC in the summer of 2011. He is a graduate student at the Frank Batten School of ¶ Leadership and Public Policy at the University of Virginia. Daniel holds a BA in Foreign Affairs ¶ from UVA and will receive his Master of Public Policy degree in May 2012. “Military Energy Security: Current Efforts and Future Solutions” <http://www.globalgreen.org/docs/publication-185-1.pdf>, SEH)

Microgrids are not without their drawbacks. Similar to the problems with the departing load ¶ charge utilities levy on installations that produce renewable energy, many utilities try to restrict ¶ the use of renewable energy generation as backup power during a power outage. The utilities’ ¶ reasoning is that, if there was any electricity in the grid during an outage, their workers would be ¶ at risk while repairing any damage. According to the GAO, four out of five installations it visited.

## Trade Off

#### B. Air power fails.

Kelly ‘2 (Michael, editor of the Atlantic Monthly, April, The Atlantic Monthly, “The Air-Power Revolution,” http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2002/04/kelly.htm)

But air power did not succeed in these tasks. Germany rested its (always doubtful) hopes for a successful invasion of Britain entirely on an air offensive (the [Battle of Britain](http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/bobhome.html)) that was intended to reduce a demoralized British people to surrender, or at least to destroy Britain’s defenses against invasion. The Luftwaffe’s campaign (including [the Blitz](http://www.iwm.org.uk/duxford/batt_ex5.htm)) killed about 43,000 people but unified and strengthened British will rather than crushing it, and never came close to wrecking Britain’s air defenses. In air power’s second great test failure was less absolute but more consequential in terms of future war-making. Britain’s Bomber Command believed not only that bombing could win the war but that precision bombing could win the war. The heavy bombers of the Royal Air Force would pulverize Germany’s manufacturing, transportation, and communication networks—thereby forcing Germany’s surrender without resorting to “area bombing,” the saturation bombing of civilians and their homes. Thus bombing would win the war without the mass slaughter of noncombatants—a civilized victory, even a humanitarian victory. Precision bombing proved markedly imprecise. In the first year of British bombing more than two thirds of the sorties failed to hit their targets. Even large targets, such as rail yards, could be hit only on moonlit nights. By the end of the first year the Bomber Command had admitted that precision bombing alone could not do the job (although later in the war inventions such as the British Pathfinder force and the American Norden bombsights made precision bombing much more precise), and Allied bombers turned increasingly to area bombing, which was to culminate in the horrors of Hamburg (45,400 dead), Dresden (50,000), Hiroshima (118,661), and Nagasaki (73,884). (Tallies are from The Oxford Companion to World War II.) Bombing could not produce victory except through civilian slaughter—unpalatable to people who wished to think of themselves as civilized. Indeed, it seemed, bombing could not produce victory even at that price. The mass bombing of Germany did not crush the German will or destroy (although it certainly crippled) Germany’s industrial capacity. And worse: bombing proved to be lethal not only to the bombed but to the bombers. Britain’s Bomber Command lost almost 56,000 [pilots] men in the war; American air forces, which engaged in high-risk daylight bombing, also lost almost that number.

#### Trades off with pivot not airpower

**Harrison 12**

Todd Harrison, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Priorities, 8/24/2012, ANALYSIS OF THE FY 2013 DEFENSE BUDGET AND SEQUESTRATION, http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2012/08/analysis-of-the-fy2013-defense-budget-and-sequestration/

The Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 defense budget currently being debated in Congress is a departure from previous budgets in several respects. It is the first budget submitted following the release of the Pentagon’s new strategic guidance, marking the beginning of a “pivot” from the wars of the past decade to the Asia-Pacific region. It is also the first budget request in more than a decade to propose a real decline in defense spending from the level currently enacted. Moreover, the prospect of sequestration hangs over the budget, threatening to cut some 10 percent of funding if Congress does not act to prevent it. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has argued that **the budget request is a “complete package**,” that “**there is little room here for** significant **modification**,” and that **any further funding reductions**, such as those called for by sequestration, **would require the Department to fundamentally rethink its new strategy**.1 Nevertheless, the FY 2013 request is unlikely to survive unscathed and the Department will likely be forced to revise its strategic guidance.

### 2AC Cuts Now

#### Modernization budget will be cut now - Mandated cuts

Weisgerber 2/12

(Marcus Weisgerber of Defense News which is a global newsweekly on politics, business and technology of defense. Defense News serves an audience of senior military, government and industry decision-makers throughout the world “2013 DoD Modernization Budget Falls 7% Below Prior Projections” Feb. 12, 2012 - 11:36AM http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120212/DEFREG02/302120003/2013-DoD-Modernization-Budget-Falls-7-Below-Prior-Projections, TSW)

The Pentagon has proposed slashing its 2013 modernization budget more than 7 percent from its spending projections a year ago, according to a U.S. Defense Department document obtained by Defense News.¶ Funds used to buy and develop new weapons, projected to total $193.3 billion in February 2012, will fall to $178.8 billion, down $14.5 billion, in DoD’s 2013 spending request, which will be sent to Congress on Feb. 13.¶ The so-called modernization budget is the sum of the procurement and research-and-development accounts in both the base budget and overseas contingency operations budget.¶ A year ago, the Pentagon projected spending $117.6 billion and procurement and another $75.7 on research and development (R&D). The new plan calls for spending $109.1 billion on procurement and $69.7 billion on R&D efforts.¶ The decline is attributed to the Pentagon’s plan to cut $487 billion from planned spending projections over the next decade. The first five years of those savings, totaling about $259 billion, will be outlined in DoD’s 2013 budget proposal.¶ The Budget Control Act of 2011, designed to lower the U.S. government deficit, mandated these defense cuts.¶ In early January, the Pentagon unveiled new strategic guidance, which officials said would help shape the cuts to defense spending. That guidance, the product of a months-long review, call for DoD to focus more on the Pacific region, while maintaining a focus on the Middle East.¶ Since the Pacific is such a vast, maritime region, spending on the Navy and Air Force programs is expected to be higher than Army and Marine Corps efforts.¶ Still, the funds requested for major mission sectors, such as aircraft and shipbuilding, in 2013 is down from what DoD asked for in 2012.¶ The Pentagon is requesting $47.6 billion for aircraft programs, down from a $54 billion 2012 request. The shipbuilding request is more than $1 billion less than last year’s $24 billion request.¶ The 2013 request includes $10.9 billion for ground systems. In 2012, DoD asked Congress to approve $16 billion for this type of equipment.¶ DoD’s 2013 budget request includes $11.9 billion for science-and-technology-related R&D nearly the same amount the Pentagon asked for in 2012.

### Plan Saves Money

#### Fuel costs spill-over and destroy the DOD budget

Freed 12 Josh, Vice President for Clean Energy, Third Way, “Improving capability, protecting 'budget”, May 21, <http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/05/powering-our-military-whats-th.php>

As Third Way explains in a digest being released this week by our National Security Program, the Pentagon’s efforts to reduce energy demand and find alternative energy sources could keep rising fuel costs from encroaching on the budgets of other important defense programs. And the payoff could be massive. The Air Force has already been able to implement behavioral and technology changes that will reduce its fuel costs by $500 million over the next five years. The Army has invested in better energy distribution systems at several bases in Afghanistan, which will save roughly $100 million each year. And, using less than 10% of its energy improvement funds, the Department has begun testing advanced biofuels for ships and planes. This relatively small investment could eventually provide the services with a cost-effective alternative to the increasingly expensive and volatile oil markets. These actions are critical to the Pentagon’s ability to focus on its defense priorities. As Secretary Panetta recently pointed out, he’s facing a $3 billion budget shortfall caused by “higher-than-expected fuel costs.” The Department’s energy costs could rise even further if action isn’t taken. DOD expects to spend $16 billion on fuel next year. The Energy Information Administration predicts the price of oil will rise 23% by 2016, without a major disruption in oil supplies, like the natural disasters, wars, and political upheaval the oil producing states have seen during the last dozen years. Meanwhile, the Pentagon’s planned budget, which will remain flat for the foreseeable future, will require significant adjustment to the Department’s pay-any-price mindset, even if sequestration does not go into effect. Unless energy costs are curbed, they could begin to eat into other budget priorities for DOD. In addition, the Pentagon’s own Defense Science Board acknowledges that using energy more efficiently makes our forces more flexible and resilient in military operations, and can provide them with greater endurance during missions. Also, by reducing energy demand in the field, DOD can minimize the number of fuel convoys that must travel through active combat zones, reducing the chances of attack to avoiding casualties and destruction of material. At our domestic bases, DOD is employing energy conservation, on-site clean energy generation, and smart grid technology to prevent disruptions to vital activities in case the civilian grid is damaged by an attack or natural disaster. The bottom line is, developing methods and technologies to reduce our Armed Forces’ use of fossil fuels and increase the availability of alternative energy makes our military stronger. That’s why the Pentagon has decided to invest in these efforts.

#### Plan saves money

Causbie and Hart 12 Lieutenant Colonel Steven Hart, Cadet Hanson Causbie, West Point, New York, United States Military Academy, May 13, “Deployable Nukes: The Future Of Nuclear Power In The Deployed Environment”, PDF Online

Ten years of operating in the deployed environment have brought to light a number of challenges faced by the United States Army. Over the course of the past decade we have developed our counterinsurgency and stability strategy operations, refined the training of our troops in a variety of fields, and fielded new equipment to help us fight and win in our current operations. Overall, we have adapted to our new environment well and created a fighting force more capable, lethal, and agile than perhaps ever before. Unfortunately, the advancement of our technology and strategy has not extended to that of infrastructure development, particularly power production. Power production and the fuel necessary for the process are a vital element of stability operations and the sustainment of troops in the deployed environment. The equipment needed to support power production, usually diesel generators, are costly and require constant time and attention to keep them operational. These generators are also heavy polluters, releasing carbon dioxide as well as other byproducts from burning diesel fuel. Additionally, thousands of gallons of fuel are required to power these generators. This fuel is often difficult to transport as well as dangerous especially in the regions where U.S. troops currently operate. A new source of power production is necessary to replace the military’s currently dirty and costly system and provide our service members with the clean, reliable, and safe power they need to fight and win our nation’s wars. Luckily, this power source has already existed for a number of years. Since its introduction in the 1960s nuclear power has continued to grow and advance at an exponential rate. The nuclear power of today is far beyond where it was even ten years ago. Clean, safe, and easy to maintain, nuclear power facilities also provide a substantial amount of power with a relatively small amount of waste compared to that of coal, natural gas, and diesel generators. With new and self- contained units now on the market nuclear power is able to be provided to almost any region in the world at a reasonable cost and with few safety risks. This new nuclear technology is also an excellent fit for deployed environment because of its self-contained operation, low fuel intake, high power output, and clean operation. This paper will assess the feasibility and practicality of small nuclear power plants for use by the United States Army in the deployed environment as an alternative to other methods of power production. Through the data presented it can be seen that the deployment of small nuclear power facilities could save the Army millions of dollars annually while substantially cutting fuel requirements. Additionally, the Army would cut its environmental waste production and leave its allied partners with a sustainable energy source which could be used for up to a decade. This paper is broken into four sections. First, the paper will present some statistics on the current power production methods in the deployed environment and data regarding fuel consumption. Next the paper will examine available nuclear technology and the benefits as well associated risks with this equipment in addition to the costs of this equipment. Third, the two methods of power production will be compared with the advantages and disadvantages of both discussed in detail. Finally, the study will close with conclusions on both power sources as well as the future of power production in the deployed environment. CURRENT POWER REQUIREMENTS AND PRODUCTION The current operational environment has completely changed the power requirements for deployed troops. In World War II, for example, a soldier consumed an average of one gallon of fuel a day. In Iraq and Afghanistan the average soldier now consumes twenty gallons of fuel daily.1 Such an increase has resulted in the Marine Corps tripling its use of energy in the deployed environment in the past ten years.2 The training, deployment, and support of military forces in the field now consume 75% of the energy used by the Department of Defense.3 In Afghanistan approximately 30% of operational fuel is used to supply power to forward deployed bases.4 70% of the logistics operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are devoted to fuel and water, a staggering amount of time and effort for only two of the thousands of resources the military must supply to its service members.5 In 2008 the Department of Defense was supplying 68 million gallons of fuel to OIF and OEF per month, or roughly 2 million gallons of fuel daily.6 In 2010, the Department of Defense spent $15 billion on fuel.7 The consumption of fuel for power is only one element of the power production process. For fuel to be consumed it must first be transported to the site requiring power. This is oftentimes one of the most dangerous jobs in the deployed environment. In Afghanistan 80% of convoys are dedicated to the transport of fuel.8 These convoys are extremely deadly, responsible for an average of one soldier killed or injured for every 24 convoys.9 Convoys have become such a danger that Marine Corps Major General Richard Zilmer sent the Pentagon a “Priority 1” request for renewable energy in order to bring awareness of the issue to higher. In 2011, the Pentagon published its first ever energy plan to address the burgeoning need for power on the battlefield. In the report the Pentagon spoke extensively about reducing the military’s energy footprint through the use of non-oil energy sources.10 The report concluded that reduction in oil usage must be reduced not only to shrink the logistical footprint of deployed troops but also because of the possible “disruption of oil supplies” in the near future.11 Size and Demands Base camps vary in size and the scope of the number of troops they must support. From platoon- sized Combat Outposts (COP) to a Forward Operating Base (FOB) of 25,000 soldiers and contractors COPs and FOBs have differing power demands depending on their mission and the equipment and troops they support. According to ATP 3-37.10, the Army’s guide to building base camps, base camps are built in four sizes. The smallest base camps are built for 50 to 299 people and are no larger than 150 by 250 meters.12 The largest base camps are for a population of 6,000 or greater with the dimensions determined by the individual planners.13 This study will focus on the latter category to include base camps of the “megabase” variety supporting up to 30,000 soldiers and contractors. This size of base camp would be the easiest to institute changes in the power infrastructure because of the massive amount of required and would also be the easiest to emplace nuclear power production facilities. The type and scope of power production also depends on the size of the base camp. At the smallest COPs there may be no source of power expect for batteries for radios and other equipment. Conversely, at Balad Air Base in Iraq the Air Force powered the base with a “generator farm” containing a number of 40 foot MILVANs holding 12 cylinder diesel generators.14 At Camp Leatherneck in Afghanistan the five megawatts of power is supplied by 196 generators consuming 15,431 gallons of fuel daily.15 On smaller FOBs and COPs power is obviously produced on a much more austere scale than the megabases of Balad and Leatherneck. Many of the generators used on larger base camps are Mobile Electric Power (MEP) units.16 One of the most common of the MEP units is the 750 KW MEP 012A Prime Power Units. These generators are powered by Cummins turbocharged twelve cylinder engines and weigh 25,000 pounds. On average these units consume 55 gallons of diesel fuel per hour.17 Many of these 012A generators are gradually being replaced by Deployable Power Generator and Distribution Systems (DPGDS) which are 25% lighter and 15% more fuel efficient than their 012A predecessors.18 82% of the generators in the deployed environment are Tactical Quiet Generators (TQG).19 These generators are available in six major models and range in size from medium suitcases to full-size tractor trailers.20 Power output for these generators ranges from as little as 3 kW to as much as 100 kW.21 These generators are usually used during early stages of a campaign or at smaller FOBs and COPs where transportation of larger generators is difficult or impossible. Varying estimates exist for the amount of power required for a large FOB and the assets which reside at the base. FOBs which support aviation assets require far more fuel than those supporting solely ground assets. One senior military official estimated that the average Army brigade (3,500 to 4,000 soldiers) requires 10,000 gallons of fuel daily or 2.5-2.8 gallons of fuel per soldier per day.22 Fuel costs range from $6.35 per gallon to as much as $45.00 per gallon for FOBs and COPs located on the “tactical edge,” or locations far from combat infrastructure and deep in enemy territory. These prices include transport and fees for the fuel required by contractors.23 Some of this fuel, however, is necessary for vehicles which are not powered by generators. Therefore, power requirements per soldier often give a more accurate picture of fuel requirements for FOBs. ATP 3.37.10 calls for anywhere from 1.5 to 3.5 KW required for each individual on a FOB.24 Approximated Power Costs A series of calculations are necessary for an accurate idea of the power and fuel requirements and the respective cost for a FOB of 25,000 soldiers and contractors. Using an average of 2 KW required per individual a FOB of 25,000 requires 50,000 KW or 500 MW of power. Assuming that the FOB is powered by the new DPGDS, consuming 47 gallons of fuel per hour at 750 KW, the base would require a minimum of 67 generators burning 3,149 gallons of fuel per hour. At a standardized price of $10.00 a gallon the cost per hour of generation is $31,490 or $755,760 per day. These calculations have been greatly simplified with a number of additional factors which must be taken into consideration. First, a number of power generation sources may be employed at a megabase described in this experiment. The construction of a more permanent power plant may decrease costs while the use of older, less efficient generator may increase fuel consumption and thus costs. Similarly, the fluctuation of fuel costs also changes the overall costs as does the fluctuation of contractor costs and contracts. Finally, this estimate does not include estimates on maintenance as well as the cost for additional generators. Many of the generators used on FOBs run at no more than 30% capacity because of maintenance issues. FOBs are also required to have more generators in case of maintenance issues or a sudden surge in power requirements.25 NUCLEAR POWER PRODUCTION AND REQUIREMENTS As can be seen in the preceding section power production through the use of generators can often be inefficient, expensive, and plagued with maintenance issues. This section will discuss the available nuclear technology for the deployed environment as well as the costs associated with this technology. Available Technology A number of nuclear reactor designs are available at varying costs and power outputs. Many of these designs are currently only available on paper while others have entered the initial stages of production. All of the designs, however, share common features which make them appropriate to the deployed environment. The first feature is their size. Reactors range in size from as small as a residential hot tub to as large as a van. This compactness allows these units to achieve specific fabrication and performance goals not found in large light water reactors. 26 Second is the self- containment of these units. Most of the current designs are simply installed in the required location and then left alone with the only maintenance required at the time of removal or refuel.27 Finally, these mini reactors are significantly safer than the prior generations of nuclear technology. Current reactors, known as Generation IV reactors, have fewer moving parts and fewer systems, thus decreasing the points of failure and thus danger of the units.28 Illustration 1 (see below) outlines a few of available nuclear power units available on today’s market. All of these units are self-contained and differ in the length of their service as well as their power output. Name Manufacturer Generating Capacity Fueling Cycle Transportable Gen4 Module (formerly Hyperion Power Module) Gen4 Energy (formerly Hyperion Power Generation) 25 (MW), scalable 8-10 years, returned to factory for refueling and waste removal Ship, rail, or truck NuScale NuScale 45 MW, scalable 2 years, on-site refueling and spent fuel cooling Ship, rail, or truck mPower The Babcock and Wilcox Company 125 MW, scalable 4.5 years, on-site refueling and waste storage Ship or rail Illustration 1: Nuclear Power Reactor Designs29 All of the units above are manufactured and then transported in their entirety to their on-site locations.30 Some of the larger units may require to be sent in components because of their size. Even though the units are self-contained they do require additional infrastructure to distribute power including but not limited to cooling towers and condensers, a steam turbine, and additional support services. Associated Costs Even though all of the above products are capable of operating in the deployed environment the Gen4 Module will be used as the example unit for a number of reasons. First, the Gen4 Module is the smallest and most transportable unit, thus making it an easier unit to integrate into FOBs and begin the transition to nuclear power. Second, the Gen4 Module is the closest to development with delivery of the first units by June of 2013.31 Finally, the Gen4 Module has some important technological advances over its counterparts which make it even more appropriate for the deployed environment. These characteristics will be discussed in detail below. The Gen4 Module is 1.5 meters wide by 2.5 meters high and is a completely self-contained unit with each reactor stocked with ten years of uranium.32 The entire unit, including fuel, weighs approximately 20 tons and requires movement by a heavy haul truck.33 The unit fits into many standard shipping containers as well, making air or water travel fairly straightforward.34 After ten years, or when the uranium has reached 15% uranium enrichment, the reactor module is replaced with a new module within the plant and the old module is shipped back to the manufacturing facility for disposal. The plant can continually produce 25 MW of power for entire ten year life of the reactor core. 35 Each unit is scheduled to cost between $25 million and $30 million dollars.36 Construction on-site will be limited to the reactor vault, water support systems, and connection of the plant to the current power infrastructure.37 Illustration 2 offers a glimpse of the dimensions and design of the unit. Illustration 2: Gen4 Energy Module38 As opposed to other light water reactor designs, the primary cooling system of the Gen4 module is not water. Instead, the reactor is cooled using a lead and bismuth composite, known as LBE. This alloy is non-reactive to air and water and has an exit temperature of 500C, thus making it much safer than water because of its higher boiling point. This makes the reactor much less susceptible to overheating.39 Additionally, such a reactor requires far less water than a traditional reactor with the only water being that in the secondary cooling loop which is self-contained within the power plant.40 Therefore, instead of the need to draw water from an exterior water source the Gen4 Module can operate on approximately 10,000 gallons of water per hour.41 This would require approximately 20,000 gallons of water to be in the system at all times.42 Assuming each unit to cost $30 million, a FOB of 25,000 personnel would require a minimum of twenty of these units to meet power demands for a total of $600 million for ten years of power production. Therefore, the total cost per day comes to approximately $164,384.00. It is important to note that this cost does not include the cost of vault construction, transport of the unit to site, or construction of the cooling system and necessary water required for the cooling of the reactor. The final construction of the power plant to support the Gen4 Module can be seen in Illustration 3. Much of this material, however, is readily available and easily transported to the deployed environments. For example, steam generators capable of supporting 25 MW of power are readily available in the commercial market and are sized to be transported with relative ease.43 After some additional research a reasonable estimate for the added cost of support structures, training, and water requirements necessary for the reactor an additional $8 million plus $3 million dollars annually would be a likely figure for each power plant. This would put the total cost of operation at $372,603.00, still less than half of the costs associated with the current power infrastructure. Even with these rough estimates using approximated numbers the benefits of nuclear technology in the deployed environment are substantial. COMPARISON After calculating the cost per day for each type of technology it can be seen that nuclear power provided by the Gen4 module costs approximately $372,603.00 per day compared to the $755,760.00 for diesel generators. Therefore, nuclear power appears to be over 50% less than the current power infrastructure in our deployed environment. Nonetheless, a number of other factors must be taken into consideration when considering the costs and considerations of nuclear power compared to diesel generators. As stated above, estimated numbers were used for predicting the costs in addition to the cost of the reactor itself. Therefore, fluctuation in costs of transport, training of personnel, water, and additional material necessary for power plant construction may drastically alter the affordability of such power plants. 25 MW steam turbines, for example, may cost as much as $2 million and vary by manufacturer and design. The need for extra training is another added cost of nuclear power. Even though Gen4 Energy includes operator training, licensing support, and technical support with the installation of their units contractors must be hired or Army personnel must be retrained in order to install the modules as well as to address any maintenance or safety issues with the plants.45 It is quite possible, however, that training for Amy personnel could be provided by other branches. The Navy, for example could provide the training or even the personnel for the sustainment of nuclear facilities. The Army may also require additional security and safety measures because of the dangers of nuclear power even though the units are buried underground and thus safe from threats of terrorism or theft. Even though the reactors discussed are buried underground and are relatively isolated from terrorist threats more research and analysis needs to be done by both the Army as well as the manufacturer to address security concerns. These challenges do not exist with the current power infrastructure. Personnel are already trained to maintain generators with minimum security and safety requirements. Generators also do not require special transport as they are not considered as volatile and dangerous as their nuclear counterparts. Additionally, the stigma associated with nuclear power does not exist with diesel power production. Education of the military population regarding the safety of nuclear power as well as our coalition partners is essential to successful use of this technology. While a host nation may not have an issue with diesel generators they may have concerns with the installation of a nuclear power facility on their own soil. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Even with the additional costs and limitations nuclear power provided by small reactors is still a viable option for the future of Army operations in the deployed environment. However, this technology may only work in certain areas suitable for this new technology. First, the technology is more cost-effective in larger FOBs because of cheaper transportation costs as well as the current high security state of these facilities. Large FOBs may also have greater access to the good and services necessary for the construction and maintenance of these facilities. Finally, larger FOBs allow for the refinement of this technology before such units are deployed closer to the tactical edge.

### 2AC Way Ahead

#### China military 20 years behind US – PLA general concedes

Xinhua 2/21

(Xinhua is the official press agency of the People's Republic of China and the biggest center for collecting information and press conferences in China. “Scholar disputes Jane's report on Chinese military” 2012-02-21 00:03:50 <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-02/21/c_131421249.htm>, TSW)

A Chinese military scholar on Monday disputed a global research group's report on China's defense budget growth, saying the motivation of the report was to play up China's military threat.¶ The IHS Jane's report said China's military budget will double by 2015, making it more than the rest of the Asia Pacific region's combined.¶ China's military spending will reach 238.2 billion U.S. dollars in 2015 compared with 119.8 billion in 2011, according to the report.¶ Li Zhaoxing, spokesman for the annual session of China's national legislature, announced in March last year that the country's defense budget in 2011 was 601 billion yuan (91.5 billion U.S. dollars), an increase of 12.7 percent from that of 2010.¶ China's defense budget in 2010 increased by 7.5 percent from that of 2009, according to official statistics.¶ Professor Ma Gang with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) National Defense University said the IHS Jane's report was sensational and lacked a rational and factual basis.¶ "The report's prediction that China's military budget will gain an annual increase of 18.75 percent in the upcoming five years was purely speculative," Ma said.¶ "The facts have proved that China's military budget increase has gone up and down over the past years and will not always keep growing fast," Ma said.¶ The Chinese government has repeated that its military budget increase over the past decade made up for restrained military construction in the 1980s.¶ According to China's official record, the country's military budget increase ratios in the past six years were 14.7 percent, 17.8 percent, 17.5 percent, 18.5 percent, 7.5 percent and 12.7 percent.¶ However, from 1979 to 1989, China's military spending had experienced an average annual decrease of 5.83 percent.¶ Chen Bingde, the PLA's Chief of the General Staff, has said that China's military hardware lagged 20 years behind that of the U.S. and other military powers.¶ China's military budget for 2011 accounted only 1.5 percent of the country's gross domestic product, in comparison with U.S.'s 4.8 percent and the U.K.'s 2.7 percent.¶ More over, the proportion of China's military budget in the country's total fiscal budget had dropped from 8.66 percent in 1998 to 6.94 percent in 2009.

### 2AC Rise Inevitable

#### China rise inevitable current strategy isn’t working

Roy 9/11

(Denny Roy, Senior Research ¶ Fellow at the East-West Center, ¶ explains that “The truth is that ¶ under the ‘hegemony’ of a regional ¶ order sponsored and enforced by ¶ the United States, China's ¶ economic, technological and ¶ military rise has been virtually ¶ unabated.” “Drop the Fallacy: The United States Is Not ¶ Blocking China’s Rise” September 11, 2012 <http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/apb179_0.pdf>, TSW)

Many Chinese believe the United States is attempting to prevent China from becoming a ¶ great power that could challenge US preeminence in the Asia-Pacific region. They allege ¶ that the United States seeks to "contain" China or "check China's rise." Some analysts ¶ outside China agree. Australia's respected strategic thinker Hugh White, for example, ¶ argues in a recent Lowy Interpreter blog posting that while the US government claims to be ¶ defending international norms, in fact the "rules" of the US-enforced order include China ¶ "accepting American primacy" and "abandon[ing] its aspirations for a larger regional ¶ role." ¶ The idea that the United States will not allow China to "rise" is wrong. It is also ¶ dangerous, adding an unnecessary layer of tension into US-China relations as these two ¶ countries work through a difficult transition in the regional power structure. The truth is ¶ that under the "hegemony" of a regional order sponsored and enforced by the United ¶ States, China's economic, technological and military rise has been virtually unabated. ¶ China is becoming a great power even amidst the Chinese claim that they are being ¶ "contained." ¶ It is a preference, but not a vital interest, of the US government that China does not ¶ become either a strong military power or a rival for regional leadership. Nevertheless, ¶ Washington is not actively opposing the rise of China. The regional security order the US ¶ helped to build up and continues to maintain includes certain features that are at least ¶ partly intended to deter or defeat possible PRC uses of force in contravention of US ¶ wishes. Yet this US-led order does not prevent China from becoming a great power. ¶Economic cooperation with the United States massively increases China's wealth ¶ accumulation, economic growth and technological advancement. The United States ¶ would not and could not forcibly prevent its security partners from accommodating China ¶ and following Chinese rather than American leadership. Governments currently friendly ¶ towards the United States are free to discontinue defense cooperation, withdraw from ¶ their alliances, and evict US bases. ¶ Even if one assumes that US policy in Asia has no motive other than its own selfish ¶ promotion of US preeminence, Washington has good strategic reasons for rejecting a ¶ policy of trying to prevent the rise of China. First, other governments would not join in. ¶ All of the Asia-Pacific countries want to do business with China and none wants to ¶ unnecessarily spoil a profitable bilateral relationship. Without the support of other states, ¶ a US attempt to contain China would be untenable. Second, attempted containment ¶ would antagonize China, ensuring long-term hostility toward the United States. The US ¶ government clearly tries to avoid such antagonism whenever possible, seemingly taking to ¶ heart the notion made famous by Joseph Nye that if China is treated as an enemy, then ¶ China will become an enemy. Third, simply attempting to weaken China would create ¶ Denny Roy, Senior Research ¶ Fellow at the East-West Center, ¶ explains that “The truth is that ¶ under the ‘hegemony’ of a regional ¶ order sponsored and enforced by ¶ the United States, China's ¶ economic, technological and ¶ military rise has been virtually ¶ unabated.” ¶ Asia Paciﬁc Bulletin Asia Paciﬁc Bulletinstrategic problems rivaling those created by a super-strong China. The region remembers ¶ the Japanese invasion of China during the Pacific War and the dangerous bravado of an ¶ insecure China during the early years of CCP rule. An economic or political collapse in ¶ China would cause turmoil in the countries on China's periphery. China has recently ¶ become such a global economic engine that a Chinese downturn could threaten the ¶ underpinnings of national and regime security in other Asian states. So an outright US ¶ policy of trying to prevent China's rise would result in the worst of both worlds: China ¶ would rise anyway, and the new, stronger China would be an unambiguous adversary of ¶ the United States. ¶ In fact, it is a caricature to see US policy toward China as simply an effort to undercut a ¶ potential rival. Americans harbor two additional generations-old instincts toward China. ¶ One is to increase bilateral trade, working toward fulfilling the imagined potential of ¶ China to serve as a market for US products and services. The second is to "lift up" China ¶ by sharing what Americans see as blessings: originally Christianity, now democracy. This ¶ may be called arrogant or condescending, but it is not ill-intended, contrary to the view of ¶ some Chinese that Americans cynically use democratization as a means of weakening ¶ other states to perpetuate US domination. These US impulses to build up China coexist ¶ with fears that a burgeoning and possibly revisionist "communist" super-state might ¶ threaten the interests of the United States and its friends in the region. The result is a ¶ hybrid US policy toward China that includes deep economic engagement and ¶ encouragement of Chinese participation in multilateral institutions alongside diplomatic ¶ and military "hedging" that aims to deter China from following certain courses of action. ¶ To be sure, US strength and leadership in the region prevents the Chinese from doing ¶ everything they wish. Washington insists that a Taiwan Strait solution must have the ¶ assent of Taiwan's people and that China should not be allowed to force its will upon ¶ other claimant nations in the South China Sea territorial disputes. But neither is the ¶ United States able to fully implement its agenda because of Chinese opposition. Chinese ¶ diplomatic and economic support for North Korea, for example, thwarts US-sponsored ¶ efforts to pressure Pyongyang to turn away from its criminal behavior. On balance, even ¶ with the United States as the strongest strategic actor in the Asia-Pacific, China is already ¶ accomplishing its most important goals of economic development, increased security and ¶ enhanced leverage both within the region and globally. ¶ US policy toward China is more accommodation than containment. President George W. ¶ Bush stated in 2002 that the United States intended to keep its "military strengths beyond ¶ challenge" by any other country. Bush's Quadrennial Defense Review in 2006 outlined ¶ that the United States will "ensure that no foreign power can dictate the terms of regional ¶ or global security" and would dissuade "any military competitor from developing . . . ¶ capabilities that could enable regional hegemony or hostile action against the United States ¶ or other friendly countries." China went ahead with developing these capabilities anyway, ¶ including the DF-21D "carrier killer" anti-ship ballistic missile designed to keep US naval ¶ task forces from intervening in western Pacific military conflicts against China's wishes. ¶ Having failed to dissuade China from pursuing a massive buildup of modernized military ¶ forces, Washington changed its approach to calling on the Chinese for more ¶ "transparency" in the intentions behind this buildup. ¶ China is thriving and winning under the auspices of a regional order allegedly designed to ¶ maintain American preeminence. Indeed, the path is clear for China to gain greater ¶ regional leadership by working within the established rules if China's relative economic ¶ growth continues. Good international citizenship—demonstrated by adherence to norms ¶ widely accepted within the region, rather than aggressive pursuit of narrow Chinese ¶ interests—will enhance China's regional leadership position, while the opposite will ¶ engender resistance from regional middle and smaller powers. Ironically for its detractors, ¶ US hegemony leaves the door open for a successor and does not legitimize attempts by a ¶ decaying hegemon to hang on for too long, should that day arrive.

## Counterplan

#### We can be the counterplan

US Code 3 Legal Information Institute, “41 USC § 131 – Acquisition”, November 24, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/41/131?quicktabs_8=1#quicktabs-8>

In division B, the term “acquisition”—¶ (1) means the process of acquiring, with appropriated amounts, by contract for purchase or lease, property or services (including construction) that support the missions and goals of an executive agency, from the point at which the requirements of the executive agency are established in consultation with the chief acquisition officer of the executive agency; and¶ (2) includes—¶ (A) the process of acquiring property or services that are already in existence, or that must be created, developed, demonstrated, and evaluated;¶ (B) the description of requirements to satisfy agency needs;¶ (C) solicitation and selection of sources;¶ (D) award of contracts;¶ (E) contract performance;¶ (F) contract financing;¶ (G) management and measurement of contract performance through final delivery and payment; and¶ (H) technical and management functions directly related to the process of fulfilling agency requirements by contract.

### perm do cp

#### DoD acquisition can includes procurement and alt financing---meets their T arg

Swoyer 12 Thomas, the president of Infinity Development Partners, “The DoD Continues To Embrace Renewable Energy,” http://www.gcxmag.com/gcx/article.asp?magarticle\_id=869

Currently, the DoD uses five primary procurement tools to acquire renewable energy projects. The first method uses appropriated funds authorized by Congress. It is a direct procurement whereby the government uses its own funds to acquire renewable technologies and issues contracts to companies to install the equipment, and in some cases, operate the equipment. For instance, the government has purchased renewable energy and Renewable Energy Certificates from utilities, an effort which is on the decline. The method fails to meet energy security requirements established in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012, as well as the intent of Executive Order 13423. ¶ The use of appropriated funds is certainly one of the fastest and simplest ways for the DoD to acquire renewable energy, however; with a future of limited budgets, this method of procurement will see limited use in the future. ¶ Another method of procurement relies primarily on private sector capital, which can be broken into the following four categories: ¶ \* Energy Savings Performance Contracts: In ESPC projects, the contractor is responsible for providing all the capital necessary to implement the energy savings project proposed by or accepted by the government. In this contractual scenario, the majority of the risk is placed on the government. While the private contractor is responsible for providing and securing the financing for the project, the financing is secured to government payments based on estimated savings versus a base year of cost. Use of ESPC contracts is on the rise after a memorandum was issued in August 2011 by the Council on Environmental Quality supporting the use of ESPC and UESC (outlined below) contracts. ¶ \* Utility Energy Service Contracts: UESC projects allow a federal agency to take advantage of project financing from a utility that serves them. The agency and the utility can enter into a contract allowing the utility to pay for energy efficiency, renewable energy and water savings projects to be repaid by that agency. ¶ \* Power Purchase Agreements: PPAs are becoming more common in federal energy purchases as they allow the agency to purchase power directly from a power generator. The power can be generated on private or public lands. The basis of the contract is that a power generator agrees to provide a specific amount of power to the government for a specific price. The development of the power generating facility is then totally the responsibility of the bidder. The Navy has been using this method for several years and most recently, the Army plans to use this method through the release of a Multiple Award Task Order Contract by the Army Corps of Engineers. This contract will allow individual companies to bid on different projects utilizing different technologies and to sell that power to the government. ¶ \* Enhanced Use Leasing: EUL projects are growing in numbers but remain one of the more complex procurement structures. EUL projects provide great flexibility for the government but to date, only the DoD and U.S. Veterans Administration use it widely. The EUL authorities allow the DoD and VA to lease parcels of property under their control for periods of up to 50 years and in the case of the VA, up to 99 years. The property can be used for the development of renewable energy assets with some of the power being sold to the government and the rest being sold to “the grid.” EULs remain complex projects with nearly all the risk being placed on the project developer. Yet, given the immense power needs of the federal government, the ability to individually procure projects and the ability to leverage very large amounts of private capital, EUL will become an increasingly popular tool with the government. ¶ These procurement methods are all in use to differing degrees. Currently, the federal government's budget process is putting pressure on all agencies to reduce spending. As spending declines, direct investment in renewable energy by federal agencies also declines. However, development of renewable energy projects is rapidly on the rise through the use of alternative financing mechanisms like ESPCs, UESCs, PPAs and EULs. Continued use of these contract vehicles gives the federal government a powerful set of tools with which to custom design the proper renewable energy portfolio that is right for them, as well as spur investment in new technologies. In the coming years, procurement methods that leverage private capital will see increased growth through widespread use.

#### Acquisition could include R&D – not a mandate but going through CP’s mechanism works

Schwartz 10 Moshe Schwartz, Specialist in Defense Acquisition April 23, 2010, Defense Acquisitions: How DOD Acquires Weapon Systems and Recent Efforts to Reform the Process, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34026.pdf

The Department of Defense (DOD) purchases goods and services from contractors to support military operations. Any **purchase of a good or service by DOD is defined as** a **procurement**. **In contrast**, the term defense **acquisition is a broader term that applies to more than just the purchase**, or procurement, of an item or service; the acquisition process encompasses the design, engineering, construction, testing, deployment, sustainment, and disposal of weapons or related items purchased from a contractor.1 DOD’s acquisition system is highly complex (see Appendix A), and does not always produce systems that meet anticipated cost or performance expectations.

### Expertise

#### And expertise

Armond Cohen 12, Executive Director of the Clean Air Task Force, “DoD: A Model for Energy Innovation?”, May 29, <http://www.catf.us/blogs/ahead/2012/05/29/dod-a-model-for-energy-innovation/>

Unlike most other agencies, including the Energy Department, the Pentagon is the ultimate customer for the new technology it helps create, spending some $200 billion each year on R&D and procurement. The implications of DoD’s role as customer have not been widely appreciated, as: · DoD, uniquely in government, supports multi-year, billion-dollar “end to end” innovation efforts that produce technology that is continuously tested, deployed and refined on bases and in the field, providing real world feedback that leads to increases in performance and reductions in cost. By contrast, most of the federal government’s civilian energy innovation efforts involve research loosely connected at best with the few commercialization efforts that it supports. · DoD and its contractors know how to bring together multiple innovations to achieve system-level advances leading to big performance gains (examples range from nuclear submarines to unmanned aircraft to large-scale information systems). This systems approach is precisely what is needed to advance clean energy technologies. · Relatively stable, multi-year funding allows the Pentagon to pursue “long cycle” innovation that is necessary for large, capital- intensive technologies and supports a highly capable contractor base that can respond to changing national security demands. · The Pentagon’s scope and budget has allowed it to experiment with new and creative innovation tools such as the well-known Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency, which has produced extraordinary technological breakthroughs; and the Environmental Security Technology Certification Program, which develops and demonstrates cost-effective improvements in environmental and energy technologies for military installations and equipment. · Because of DoD’s size and demands for performance and reliability, it is unique among government and private sector organizations as a demonstration test-bed. Smart-grid technologies and advanced energy management systems for buildings are already poised to benefit from this aspect of the Pentagon’s innovation system. · DoD has collaborated effectively with other federal agencies, including the Department of Energy and its predecessors (for example, to advance nuclear energy technologies). Continuing competition and cooperation between DoD and DOE will spur energy innovation.  DoD’s innovation capabilities can enhance U.S. national security, improve U.S. international competitiveness, and spur global energy restructuring and greenhouse gas emissions reductions. At the same time, while providing enormous opportunities to develop and test energy efficiency technologies and small scale distributed energy appropriate to forward bases, the Pentagon is unlikely to become an all-purpose hub for advancing all categories of clean-energy technologies, because its energy innovation activities will be sustainable only where they can support the nation’s defense capabilities. Therefore, many other large-scale technologies that are of great importance to improving the environment, such as carbon-free central station generation or zero carbon transportation, may not as easily fit with DoD’s mission. Possible exceptions might include small modular nuclear reactors that can be used for producing independent, non-grid power at military bases, or, conceivably, zero-carbon liquid fuels other than anything resembling current generation biofuels.

### Market Pull

**The military is the necessary first purchaser of new technology necessary to overcome market failures. Comparative evidence.**

**Cohen 12** (Armond, Executive Director – Clean Air Task Force, *DoD: A Model for Energy Innovation?*, http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/05/powering-our-military-whats-th.php#2211477)

Recently, the Clean Air Task Force and our colleagues at The Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes at Arizona State University, assessed the opportunities and challenges at the U.S. Department of Defense for accelerating a national and even global transition to advanced and clean energy technologies.

Building on background papers, a workshop, new research, and a previous project that articulated foundational principles for federal energy innovation policies, this report identified the sources of DoD’s success in fostering new technology that can be applied to both civilian energy innovation efforts and future defense-related energy efforts.

Unlike most other agencies, including the Energy Department, the Pentagon is the ultimate customer for the new technology it helps create, spending some $200 billion each year on R&D and procurement. The implications of DoD’s role as customer have not been widely appreciated, as:

· DoD, uniquely in government, supports multi-year, billion-dollar “end to end” innovation efforts that produce technology that is continuously tested, deployed and refined on bases and in the field, providing **real world feedback** that leads to **increases in performance** and **reductions in cost**. By contrast, most of the federal government’s civilian energy innovation efforts involve research loosely connected at best with the few commercialization efforts that it supports.

· DoD and its contractors know how to **bring together multiple innovations** to achieve **system-level advances** leading to **big performance gains** (examples range from nuclear submarines to unmanned aircraft to large-scale information systems). This systems approach is precisely what is needed to advance clean energy technologies.

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DoD’s innovation capabilities can enhance U.S. national security, improve U.S. international competitiveness, and spur global energy restructuring and greenhouse gas emissions reductions.

At the same time, while providing enormous opportunities to develop and test energy efficiency technologies and small scale distributed energy appropriate to forward bases, the Pentagon is unlikely to become an all-purpose hub for advancing all categories of clean-energy technologies, because its energy innovation activities will be sustainable only where they can support the nation’s defense capabilities.

Therefore, many other large-scale technologies that are of great importance to improving the environment, such as carbon-free central station generation or zero carbon transportation, may not as easily fit with DoD’s mission. Possible exceptions might include small modular nuclear reactors that can be used for producing independent, non-grid power at military bases, or, conceivably, zero-carbon liquid fuels other than anything resembling current generation biofuels.

In any case, the challenge for military-led energy innovation is to further define and delineate avenues for improved clean-energy performance that are linked to the national strategic mission. History shows that when such linkages are strong, DoD’s innovation capabilities are **second to none**.

But perhaps the more important lesson from this work is that a serious American program of civilian energy innovation could profitably look to Pentagon history for clues about how to succeed. Stable and significant funding; “end to end” thinking on long innovation cycles; procurement of advanced energy technology at commercial scale as well as research and testing; and institutional experimentation and diversity using multiple institutional channels – these have been important reasons that the United States has the most lethal and effective military arsenal in world history. If we’re serious about maintaining American superiority in the energy technology domain, some of this “defense innovation DNA” needs to be replicated or adapted to meet the challenge.

#### DoD installations are key – market pull

Jeffrey **Marqusee 12**, Executive Director of the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) and the Environmental Security Technology Certification Program (ESTCP) at the Department of Defense, “Military Installations and Energy Technology Innovation”, March, <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Energy%20Innovation%20at%20DoD.pdf>

The key reason that DoD cannot passively rely on the private sector to provide a suite of new, cost-effective energy technologies is the difficulty of the transition from research and development to full deployment. Many have noted this challenge; it is often described as the “Valley of Death,” a term widely used in the early and mid-1990s to describe the obstacles to commercialization and deployment of environmental technologies. DoD’s environmental technology demonstration program, the Environmental Security Technology Certification Program (ESTCP), was created to overcome that hurdle. Why can’t DoD rely on the Department of Energy (DOE) to solve the commercialization and deployment problem? DOE has a mixed record in this area. Reasons for past failures at DOE are: 1) the lack of a market within DOE for the technologies; 2) overly optimistic engineering estimates; 3) lack of attention to potential economic or market failures; 4) a disconnect between business practices at DOE and commercial practices, which leads to demonstration results that are not credible in the private sector; and 5) programs completely driven by a technology “push,” rather than a mix of technology push and market-driven pull.81 Many of these issues can be viewed as arising from the first: the lack of a market within DOE. Since DOE is neither the ultimate supplier nor buyer of these technologies at the deployment scale, it is not surprising that there are challenges in creating a system that can bring technologies across the Valley of Death. DoD’s market size allows it to play a critical role in overcoming this challenge for the energy technologies the department’s installations require, as it has for environmental technologies. In addressing the barriers energy technologies face, and understanding the role DoD installations can play, it is important to understand the type and character of technologies that DoD installations need. Energy technologies span a wide spectrum in costs, complexities, size, and market forces. Installation energy technologies are just a subset of the field, but one that is critical in meeting the nation’s and DoD’s energy challenges. DOE, in its recent strategic plans and quadrennial technology review, has laid out the following taxonomy (figure 3.5): It is useful to divide these energy technologies into two rough classes based on the nature of the market and the characteristics of deployment decisions. There are technologies whose capital costs at full scale are very high, for which a modest number of players will play a key role in implementation decisions. Examples include utility-scale energy generation, large-scale carbon sequestration, commercial production of alternative fuels, nextgeneration utility-grid-level technologies, and manufacturing of new transportation platforms. Some of these technologies produce products (e.g., fuel and power from the local utility) that DoD installations buy as commodities, but DoD does not expect to buy the underlying technology. A second but no less important class of energy technologies are those that will be widely distributed upon implementation, and the decisions to deploy them at scale will be made by thousands, if not millions, of decision makers. These include: 1) Technologies to support improved energy efficiency and conservation in buildings; 2) Local renewable or distributed energy generation; and 3) Local energy control and management technologies. Decisions on implementing these technologies will be made in a distributed sense and involve tens of thousands of individual decision makers if they are ever to reach large-scale deployment. These are the energy technologies that DoD installations will be buying, either directly through appropriated funds or in partnership with third-party financing through mechanisms such as Energy Saving Performance Contracts (ESPCs) or Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs). In the DOE taxonomy shown above, these distributed installation energy technologies cover the demand space on building and industrial efficiency, portions of the supply space for clean electricity when restricted to distributed generation scale, and a critical portion in the middle where microgrids and their relationship to energy storage and electric vehicles reside.

### DoD k to Comercialization

#### No small nuclear reactors without DOD action.

Andres and Breetz 11

(Richard B. Andres is Professor of ¶ national Security Strategy at the ¶ national War College and a Senior fellow and energy and environmental ¶ Security and Policy Chair in the Center ¶ for Strategic research, institute for national Strategic Studies, at the national Defense University. Hanna L. Breetz is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts institute of technology, “Small Nuclear Reactors ¶ for Military Installations:¶ Capabilities, Costs, and ¶ Technological Implications” Institute for National Strategic Studies, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/strforum/sf-262.pdf>, SEH)

It is possible, of course, that small reactors will ¶ achieve commercialization without DOD assistance. As ¶ discussed above, they have garnered increasing attention ¶ in the energy community. Several analysts have even argued that small reactors could play a key role in the second nuclear era, given that they may be the only reactors ¶ within the means of many U.S. utilities and developing ¶ countries.¶ 33¶ However, given the tremendous regulatory ¶ hurdles and technical and financial uncertainties, it appears far from certain that the U.S. small reactor industry ¶ will take off. If DOD wants to ensure that small reactors ¶ are available in the future, then it should pursue a leadership role now.

### US Influence

#### DOD key- preserves US nuclear influence.

Andres and Breetz 11

(Richard B. Andres is Professor of ¶ national Security Strategy at the ¶ national War College and a Senior fellow and energy and environmental ¶ Security and Policy Chair in the Center ¶ for Strategic research, institute for national Strategic Studies, at the national Defense University. Hanna L. Breetz is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts institute of technology, “Small Nuclear Reactors ¶ for Military Installations:¶ Capabilities, Costs, and ¶ Technological Implications” Institute for National Strategic Studies, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/strforum/sf-262.pdf>, SEH)

Domestic Nuclear Expertise. From the perspective of larger national security issues, if DOD does not ¶ catalyze the small reactor industry, there is a risk that ¶ expertise in small reactors could become dominated ¶ by foreign companies. A 2008 Defense Intelligence ¶ Agency report warned that the United States will become totally dependent on foreign governments for future commercial nuclear power unless the military acts ¶ as the prime mover to reinvigorate this critical energy ¶ technology with small, distributed power reactors.¶ 38¶ Several of the most prominent small reactor concepts ¶ rely on technologies perfected at Federally funded ¶ laboratories and research programs, including the Hyperion Power Module (Los Alamos National Laboratory), NuScale (DOE-sponsored research at Oregon ¶ State University), IRIS (initiated as a DOE-sponsored ¶ project), Small and Transportable Reactor (Lawrence ¶ Livermore National Laboratory), and Small, Sealed, ¶ Transportable, Autonomous Reactor (developed by a team including the Argonne, Lawrence Livermore, and ¶ Los Alamos National Laboratories). However, there ¶ are scores of competing designs under development ¶ from over a dozen countries. If DOD does not act ¶ early to support the U.S. small reactor industry, there ¶ is a chance that the industry could be dominated by ¶ foreign companies. Along with other negative consequences, the decline ¶ of the U.S. nuclear industry decreases the NRC’s influence on the technology that supplies the world’s rapidly ¶ expanding demand for nuclear energy. Unless U.S. companies begin to retake global market share, in coming ¶ decades France, China, South Korea, and Russia will dictate standards on nuclear reactor reliability, performance, ¶ and proliferation resistance.

## Immigration

### **No Pass**

#### **Won’t Pass: Obama will alienate the coalition**

Brock 2/9

[PolicyMic, Jana, Political columnist, http://www.policymic.com/articles/25188/immigration-reform-2013-what-the-president-can-learn-from-the-obamacare-battle, mg]

President Obama should exercise caution. He is going off on his own path instead of working with Congress. If he chooses to **approach immigration reform this way, he will** once again alienate a host of congressional members. He has to work with Congress not against them. It will guarantee more court battles and intense showdowns. But most importantly, it will ensure that immigration reform will not happen while he is in office.

### Winners Win

**Political Capital Not Key and Winners Win**

Michael **Hirsh 2/7**, Chief correspondent for National Journal. He also contributes to 2012 Decoded. Hirsh previously served as the senior editor and national economics correspondent for Newsweek, based in its Washington bureau, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207

On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, **the pundits will** do what they always do this time of year: They will talk **about how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by** sagacious reckonings of **how much “political capital” Obama possesses to push his program through**. **Most of this talk will have no bearing on what actually happens over the next four years. Consider** this: **Three months ago**, just before the November election, **if someone had talked seriously about Obama having enough political capital to oversee passage of both immigration reform and gun-control legislation** at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—**this person would have been called crazy** and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. And yet, **for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity**—**variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “political capital**”—**chances are fair that both will now happen**. What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.” As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: **The political tectonics have shifted dramatically in very little time. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago.** Meanwhile, **the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform**, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority**. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital** or, indeed, Obama at all. **The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term**. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason**, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens.** It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, **it suggests,** erroneously, **that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest**, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger. But **the abrupt emergence of** the **immigration and gun-control** issues **illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly**. Indeed, **the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try.** Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “**Winning wins.**” **In theory, and in practice,** depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, **even in a polarized time**, **he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks.** Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. **Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue;** there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, **if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors”** Ornstein says. “**If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”** ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ Sometimes, **a clever practitioner of power can get more done just because he’s aggressive** and knows the hallways of Congress well. Texas A&M’s Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But **one of the main reasons for that mandate** (in addition to Goldwater’s ineptitude as a candidate) **was** President **Johnson’s masterful use of power** leading up to that election, **and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital.** In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late 1963. Don’t focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers’ support for a tax cut and appropriations bills the president needed. “One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtn’t to expend it on this,” Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was called in those days.) Johnson replied, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?” **Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act enacted, along with much else**: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro records. “Momentum is not a mysterious mistress,” LBJ said. “It is a controllable fact of political life.” Johnson had the skill and wherewithal to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.) And then there are the presidents who get the politics, and the issues, wrong. It was the last president before Obama who was just starting a second term, George W. Bush, who really revived the claim of political capital, which he was very fond of wielding. Then Bush promptly demonstrated that he didn’t fully understand the concept either. At his first news conference after his 2004 victory, a confident-sounding Bush declared, “I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it. That’s my style.” The 43rd president threw all of his political capital at an overriding passion: the partial privatization of Social Security. He mounted a full-bore public-relations campaign that included town-hall meetings across the country. **Bush failed utterly**, of course. **But the problem was not that he didn’t have enough political capital.** Yes, he may have overestimated his standing. Bush’s margin over John Kerry was thin—helped along by a bumbling Kerry campaign that was almost the mirror image of Romney’s gaffe-filled failure this time—but that was not the real mistake. **The problem was that whatever credibility or stature Bush thought he had earned as a newly reelected president did nothing to make Social Security privatization a better idea in most people’s eyes**. Voters didn’t trust the plan, and four years later, at the end of Bush’s term, the stock-market collapse bore out the public’s skepticism. Privatization just didn’t have any momentum behind it, no matter who was pushing it or how much capital Bush spent to sell it. The mistake that Bush made with Social Security, says John Sides, an associate professor of political science at George Washington University and a well-followed political blogger, “was that just because he won an election, he thought he had a green light. But there was no sense of any kind of public urgency on Social Security reform. It’s like he went into the garage where various Republican policy ideas were hanging up and picked one. I don’t think Obama’s going to make that mistake.… Bush decided he wanted to push a rock up a hill. He didn’t understand how steep the hill was. I think Obama has more momentum on his side because of the Republican Party’s concerns about the Latino vote and the shooting at Newtown.” Obama may also get his way on the debt ceiling, not because of his reelection, Sides says, “but because Republicans are beginning to doubt whether taking a hard line on fiscal policy is a good idea,” as the party suffers in the polls. THE REAL LIMITS ON POWER **Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span**, of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. **But this**, too, **has nothing to do with political capital.** **Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much political capital passing the health care law in his first term**. **But the real problem was that the plan was unpopular, the economy was bad**, and the president didn’t realize that the national mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010—haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout, aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pockets—government-imposed health care coverage was simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and what ensued: two titanic fights over the debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an issue that was out of sync with the country’s mood. Unlike Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reform was that it distracted the government’s attention from other issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various congressional staffers told me at the time that their bosses didn’t really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room, the aides said. Weighing the imponderables of momentum, the often-mystical calculations about when the historic moment is ripe for an issue, will never be a science. It is mainly intuition, and its best practitioners have a long history in American politics. This is a tale told well in Steven Spielberg’s hit movie Lincoln. Daniel Day-Lewis’s Abraham Lincoln attempts a lot of behind-the-scenes vote-buying to win passage of the 13th Amendment, banning slavery, along with eloquent attempts to move people’s hearts and minds. He appears to be using the political capital of his reelection and the turning of the tide in the Civil War. But it’s clear that a surge of conscience, a sense of the changing times, has as much to do with the final vote as all the backroom horse-trading. “The reason I think the idea of political capital is kind of distorting is that it implies you have chits you can give out to people. It really oversimplifies why you elect politicians, or why they can do what Lincoln did,” says Tommy Bruce, a former political consultant in Washington. Consider, as another example, the storied political career of President Franklin Roosevelt. Because the mood was ripe for dramatic change in the depths of the Great Depression, FDR was able to push an astonishing array of New Deal programs through a largely compliant Congress, assuming what some described as near-dictatorial powers. But in his second term, full of confidence because of a landslide victory in 1936 that brought in unprecedented Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, Roosevelt overreached with his infamous Court-packing proposal. All of a sudden, the political capital that experts thought was limitless disappeared. FDR’s plan to expand the Supreme Court by putting in his judicial allies abruptly created an unanticipated wall of opposition from newly reunited Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. FDR thus inadvertently handed back to Congress, especially to the Senate, the power and influence he had seized in his first term. Sure, Roosevelt had loads of popularity and momentum in 1937. He seemed to have a bank vault full of political capital. But, once again, a president simply chose to take on the wrong issue at the wrong time; this time, instead of most of the political interests in the country aligning his way, they opposed him. Roosevelt didn’t fully recover until World War II, despite two more election victories. **In terms of Obama’s second-term agenda, what all these shifting tides of momentum and political calculation mean is this: Anything goes**. Obama has no more elections to win, and he needs to worry only about the support he will have in the House and Senate after 2014. **But if he picks issues that the country’s mood will support**—such as, perhaps, immigration reform and gun control—**there is no reason to think he can’t win far more victories than any of the careful calculators of political capital now believe is possible**, **including battles over tax reform and deficit reduction**. **Amid today’s atmosphere of Republican self-doubt, a new, more mature Obama seems to be emerging**, one who has his agenda clearly in mind and will ride the mood of the country more adroitly**. If he can get some early wins**—as he already has, apparently, on the fiscal cliff and the upper-income tax increase—**that will create momentum**, **and one win may well lead to others**. “Winning wins.” **Obama himself learned some hard lessons over the past four years about the falsity of the political-capital concept**. Despite his decisive victory over John McCain in 2008, he fumbled the selling of his $787 billion stimulus plan by portraying himself naively as a “post-partisan” president who somehow had been given the electoral mandate to be all things to all people. So Obama tried to sell his stimulus as a long-term restructuring plan that would “lay the groundwork for long-term economic growth.” The president thus fed GOP suspicions that he was just another big-government liberal. Had he understood better that the country was digging in against yet more government intervention and had sold the stimulus as what it mainly was—a giant shot of adrenalin to an economy with a stopped heart, a pure emergency measure—he might well have escaped the worst of the backlash. But by laying on ambitious programs, and following up quickly with his health care plan, he only sealed his reputation on the right as a closet socialist. After that, Obama’s public posturing provoked automatic opposition from the GOP, no matter what he said. **If the president put his personal imprimatur on any plan**—from deficit reduction, to health care, to immigration reform—**Republicans were virtually guaranteed to come out against it.** But this year, when he sought to exploit the chastened GOP’s newfound willingness to compromise on immigration, his approach was different. He seemed to understand that the Republicans needed to reclaim immigration reform as their own issue, and he was willing to let them have some credit. When he mounted his bully pulpit in Nevada, he delivered another new message as well: You Republicans don’t have to listen to what I say anymore. And don’t worry about who’s got the political capital. Just take a hard look at where I’m saying this: in a state you were supposed to have won but lost because of the rising Hispanic vote. Obama was cleverly pointing the GOP toward conclusions that he knows it is already reaching on its own: If you, the Republicans, want to have any kind of a future in a vastly changed electoral map, you have no choice but to move. It’s your choice. **The future is wide open**.

### High Skilled Inevitable

#### High Skilled Expansion inevitable

Oppenheimer 2-7

Andres is a Columnist for the Miami Herald, “Immigration and the Global Race for Talent,” <http://www.thestate.com/2013/02/07/2618543/commentary-immigration-and-the.html#.URQfuqXAez5>

Under a bipartisan bill led by Sen. Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, and known as the Immigration Innovation Act, the United States would eliminate restrictions on visas for workers with graduate degrees in science, technology, engineering and mathematics from qualified U.S. universities, and would almost double existing quotas for other highly-skilled private sector workers.¶ The bill, which may become part of Obama’s comprehensive immigration reform plan, is very likely to pass, congressional sources say.¶ While Democrats and Republicans are still arguing over other parts of Obama’s immigration plan, which would give a path to legal status for up to 11 million undocumented residents, both parties agree on the need to dramatically increase the number of visas for foreign scientists to help make the U.S. economy more competitive.¶ “This is a big, big step forwards,” says Vivek Wadhwa, a well-known innovation guru with Singularity University and author of The Immigrant Exodus, a book arguing that the United States is falling behind in innovation because of its failure to retain the scientists who graduate from its universities.¶ Right now, most U.S. visas are given based on family ties, rather than on professional skills. Only 7 percent of U.S. visas are given to foreigners based on their skills, compared with 25 percent in Canada, 42 percent in Australia, 58 percent in Britain, 80 percent in Switzerland and 81 percent in South Korea, according to a recent study by the Partnership for a New American Economy.¶ Under the Hatch bill, the number of highly-skilled foreigners admitted into the United States could double to 280,000 from the current 140,000 a year, according to Wadhwa.¶ “The race for skilled immigrants is intensifying in today’s knowledge-based economy,” Wadhwa told me. “In the past, it was all about manufacturing, and you needed workers. Now, it’s all about technology and innovation, and you need skilled scientists and engineers.”

### No Impact to Worker Shortage

#### Skilled Workers shortages are exaggerated- companies are highly selective for low wage purposes and manufacturing sector is growing

Davidson 10/15

(Paul, Journalist CNBC cites report from Boston Consulting Group, “Skilled-Worker Shortage Is Exaggerated, Says Study,” 10/15/2012, <http://www.amren.com/news/2012/10/skilled-worker-shortage-is-exaggerated-says-study/>) RC

A shortage of skilled manufacturing workers that’s blamed for helping push up unemployment is far smaller than believed, according to a study out today.¶ The study by Boston Consulting Group (BCG) says manufacturers may have openings they can’t fill, but it’s not because workers aren’t out there. It’s because companies are being too selective about who they hire and are unwiwlling to pay a competitive wage.¶ The report acknowledges a mild skills gap. U.S. manufacturers could use an additional 80,000 to 100,000 highly skilled employees—less than 1% of all factory workers and less than 8% of highly skilled workers, the study says. Workers in highest demand are welders, machinists and mechanics.¶ But that’s far less than the deficit of 600,000 skilled workers cited in a survey last summer by Deloitte and the Manufacturing Institute.¶ “There’s a relatively small skills gap that can be managed,” says BCG senior partner Hal Sirkin.¶ {snip}¶ It says 58% of high-skill manufacturing and engineering jobs remain open at least three to six months. But Sirkin says that’s partly because employers are not committed enough to hiring the workers.¶ A genuine skills gap would have pushed average annual wage growth 3 percentage points above the rate of inflation over the past five years, the study says, citing a common economic benchmark. Instead, manufacturing wages have grown roughly in line with a below-3% inflation rate.¶

#### Shortage exaggerated- skills gap is low

Sims 10/18

(David, Journalist Industry market Trend, “Skilled Worker Shortage May Be Exaggerated,” 10/18/2012, <http://news.thomasnet.com/IMT/2012/10/18/skilled-worker-shortage-may-be-exaggerated/>) RC

Although many manufacturers report struggling to find skilled workers to fill open positions, a new study suggests that the widely cited manufacturing shortage may be overstated, with fewer than 100,000 unfilled jobs in the sector.¶ Related Stories¶ IMT Exclusive Q&A: CNC Jobs’ Robert Lawson on the Manufacturing Labor Shortage¶ Manufacturers Face Skilled Labor Crisis¶ Why More Women Aren’t in Manufacturing¶ Last year, a Deloitte report caused a stir when it found that the United States manufacturing industry was struggling to find enough skilled workers to fill open jobs, with as many as 600,000 jobs going unfilled despite an elevated national unemployment rate.¶ “Manufacturing work is changing so quickly that it’s harder for talent to keep up,” Thomas Morrison, principal at Deloitte Consulting LLP, remarked.¶ However, a new study from the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) suggests the situation is less profound. BCG researchers found that the so-called “skills gap” in U.S. manufacturing today does exist, but that it’s much less severe than many believe.¶ U.S. manufacturing is short “some 80,000 to 100,000 highly skilled manufacturing workers, less than 1 percent of the nation’s 11.5 million manufacturing workers and less than 8 percent of its 1.4 million highly skilled manufacturing workers,” according to the report.¶ The BCG report is based on a survey conducted in February of more than 100 U.S.-based manufacturing executives at companies with annual sales of $1 billion or greater.¶ Among the 50 largest manufacturing areas, increases in compensation for job offers were only seen in Baton Rouge, Charlotte, Miami, San Antonio and Wichita. Job-offer wage growth is an indicator of labor shortages because it suggests employers are trying to make jobs more attractive to workers. Growth was seen primarily for welders, machinists and industrial-machinery mechanics. The study looked for wage growth over 3 percent above inflation per year for the last five years.¶

### Flooding the Zone Solves

#### Obama proposing multiple competing bills solves

Todd et al 2-5

Chuck is an NBC News’ Chief Political Correspondent, “Flooding the Zone,” <http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/05/16852487-first-thoughts-flooding-the-zone>

\*\*\* Flooding the zone: Exactly one week away from President Obama’s State of the Union address, the White House has spent the early days of the second term flooding the zone with its legislative agenda. Last week, the president delivered his big immigration speech in Las Vegas. Yesterday, he spoke about gun violence in Minnesota. Today, he’s meeting at the White House with progressive, labor, and business leaders to discuss immigration reform and the budget situation. What’s going on here: The Obama White House wants to overload Washington’s political circuits in an effort to see what it can get through Congress -- without letting Congress define what issues get addressed. After all, Republicans want to solely talk about the budget before the March budget showdown (see yesterday’s multiple coordinated responses by House Republicans on the White House’s announcement it would be late with its budget). Yet by flooding the zone, Team Obama -- with the bully pulpit and the State of the Union at its disposal -- wants to widen the political dialogue beyond that one issue. This “flooding the zone” concept is how the Obama White House operated in the first six months of the first term, and it’s where he got most of his legislative achievements. When the White House got bogged down on ONE issue (health care, debt ceiling, etc), officials determined they lost some of their political capital.

#### Plan popular in Congress- Only 1 vote against it and both parties cosponsor

Pendidikan ‘11

Cinta writes for the Love and Like Education Blog, “Sanders is the Sole Vote Against Small Modular Reactor Research,” <http://loveandlikeeducation.blogspot.com/2011/08/bernie-sanders-and-small-modular.html>

Sanders is Sole Vote Against Small Modular Reactor Research¶ Bernie Sanders and Small Modular Reactors¶ Senator Bernie Sanders often speaks about his opposition to Vermont Yankee as having something to do with the age of the plant, the fact it is owned by Entergy, or his "state's rights" stance about regulating nuclear power plants.¶ Recently, however, Sanders made it clear that he is against nuclear power in any form and is proud of that opinion. On Senator Sanders website, he featured the fact that he was the only vote against "a pair of measures that would promote the development of small modular reactors."¶ One of these measures was the Nuclear Power Act S512. This act would authorize the Secretary of Energy to start a cost-shared program for development of small modular reactors (SMRs).¶ This act had strong bi-partisan support, being sponsored by 3 Republican and 4 Democratic Senators. The act requires research and development funds for SMRs. The Act is still in process, and does not have a firm dollar amount attached, but the dollar amount is likely to be small (in government terms, at least.). Current estimates are $100 million per fiscal year for four years, starting next year.¶ The act also requires that industry cost-share the expense. If industry doesn't think it is worth spending money on the research, the research will not receive government funding either.¶ As a background to the probable cost of this Act, we should note that President Obama requested $4.8 billion dollars for Department of Energy research, of which $3.2 billion is allocated for renewable energy and energy efficiency research. (This number has changed with the debt deal, but new numbers are not available at this time.)¶ Small Modular Reactors for The Future¶ Sander's opposition to this Nuclear Power Act will hurt America's chances to develop an important new exportable technology. Outside of Europe, the nuclear renaissance remains in full swing, with reactors being ordered and built in Arabia, China, India and Southeast Asia. Developing a strong set of SMR designs would be America's best chance to re-entering the world market for nuclear power.¶ SMRs are modular (assembled in a factory and delivered to the site), small (50 to 225 MW) and have many safety features, such as passive cooling. SMRs are expected to have a huge international market. They suitable for many places that do not have the population density or money for the current crop of huge reactors (1200 MW, built on site at great expense). SMRs would make nuclear power affordable and salable many places.¶ Westinghouse and Babcock & Wilcox have invested significant amounts of their own money in developing these products. The NRC is also active in assessing preliminary designs. At another Senate committee meeting on SMRs, Commissioner Magwood of the NRC said that he does not expect decisions made by the NRC to be the critical factor in the success or failure of SMRs. Magwood noted that SMRs have passive safety features and large water inventories; these would be considered during license review.¶ America Fallen Behind¶ America has fallen far behind the rest of the world in most nuclear technologies. Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) and Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) were developed in this country. They are being sold all over the world, but not by United States companies. We're out of the running. Other countries licensed and improved our original technologies. Companies from France, Korea, Russia and China compete to build large reactors in China, Arabia, and Southeast Asia.¶ Three American companies have put millions of dollars into the development of SMRs: Westinghouse, Babcock & Wilcox, and NuScale (a small start-up). Many people in the nuclear industry feel that the race to develop the first successful SMR is a truly high-stakes race, being fought at the level of nationwide efforts. Luckily, SMR development has bi-partisan support, and Mr. Sanders was alone in his opposition to supporting American industry efforts to develop these plants.¶ Should Government Be Involved?¶ Of course, one can make a case that the government should get out of the energy research business altogether. If Senator Sanders wished to save tax dollars by cutting all energy-research programs, he might have a valid case. However, if the government does plan to spend money on energy research, cost-sharing with industry on a new nuclear technology is certainly a far better use of funds than many of the projects in the swollen DOE renewable budget.

#### Plan shields controversy

Appelbaum 12

Binyamin, Defense cuts would hurt scientific R&D, experts say, The New York Times, 1-8, <http://hamptonroads.com/2012/01/defense-cuts-would-hurt-scientific-rd-experts-say>

Sarewitz, who studies the government's role in promoting innovation, said the Defense Department had been more successful than other federal agencies because it is the main user of the innovations that it finances. The Pentagon, which spends billions each year on weapons, equipment and technology, has an unusually direct stake in the outcome of its research and development projects.¶ "The central thing that distinguishes them from other agencies is that they are the customer," Sarewitz said. "You can't pull the wool over their eyes."¶ Another factor is the Pentagon's relative insulation from politics, which has allowed it to sustain a long-term research agenda in controversial areas**.** No matter which party is in power, the Pentagon has continued to invest in clean-energy technology, for example, in an effort to find ways to reduce one of its largest budget items, energy costs.

### Econ Defense

**No recession impact**

Coleman ‘3

(Glenn, writer for Money Magazine, CNN, “Peter Lynch: Why he's buying now,” 1-24, http://money.cnn.com/2003/01/23/funds/lynch/)

Recessions are scary things, and the obvious worries about jobs and bonuses and bills and bankruptcies-- the background noise that keeps you awake at night, Lynch calls it--often mute an important fact: **The U.S. economy has seen 10 recessions since 1945, and it has emerged from nine of them stronger than before**. Of course, it's not a fact yet that we'll pull ourselves No. 10 in better shape.

#### Economic decline does not cause shooting wars

Miller 2k

(Morris, economist, adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Administration, consultant on international development issues, former Executive Director and Senior Economist at the World Bank, Winter, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Vol. 25, Iss. 4, “Poverty as a cause of wars?” p. Proquest)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

# 1AR

### 2AC T.O. With Pivot

#### Trades off with pivot not airpower

**Harrison 12**

Todd Harrison, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Priorities, 8/24/2012, ANALYSIS OF THE FY 2013 DEFENSE BUDGET AND SEQUESTRATION, http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2012/08/analysis-of-the-fy2013-defense-budget-and-sequestration/

The Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 defense budget currently being debated in Congress is a departure from previous budgets in several respects. It is the first budget submitted following the release of the Pentagon’s new strategic guidance, marking the beginning of a “pivot” from the wars of the past decade to the Asia-Pacific region. It is also the first budget request in more than a decade to propose a real decline in defense spending from the level currently enacted. Moreover, the prospect of sequestration hangs over the budget, threatening to cut some 10 percent of funding if Congress does not act to prevent it. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has argued that **the budget request is a “complete package**,” that “**there is little room here for** significant **modification**,” and that **any further funding reductions**, such as those called for by sequestration, **would require the Department to fundamentally rethink its new strategy**.1 Nevertheless, the FY 2013 request is unlikely to survive unscathed and the Department will likely be forced to revise its strategic guidance.

### 2AC Air power

#### Air power fails.

Kelly ‘2 (Michael, editor of the Atlantic Monthly, April, The Atlantic Monthly, “The Air-Power Revolution,” http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2002/04/kelly.htm)

But air power did not succeed in these tasks. Germany rested its (always doubtful) hopes for a successful invasion of Britain entirely on an air offensive (the [Battle of Britain](http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/bobhome.html)) that was intended to reduce a demoralized British people to surrender, or at least to destroy Britain’s defenses against invasion. The Luftwaffe’s campaign (including [the Blitz](http://www.iwm.org.uk/duxford/batt_ex5.htm)) killed about 43,000 people but unified and strengthened British will rather than crushing it, and never came close to wrecking Britain’s air defenses. In air power’s second great test failure was less absolute but more consequential in terms of future war-making. Britain’s Bomber Command believed not only that bombing could win the war but that precision bombing could win the war. The heavy bombers of the Royal Air Force would pulverize Germany’s manufacturing, transportation, and communication networks—thereby forcing Germany’s surrender without resorting to “area bombing,” the saturation bombing of civilians and their homes. Thus bombing would win the war without the mass slaughter of noncombatants—a civilized victory, even a humanitarian victory. Precision bombing proved markedly imprecise. In the first year of British bombing more than two thirds of the sorties failed to hit their targets. Even large targets, such as rail yards, could be hit only on moonlit nights. By the end of the first year the Bomber Command had admitted that precision bombing alone could not do the job (although later in the war inventions such as the British Pathfinder force and the American Norden bombsights made precision bombing much more precise), and Allied bombers turned increasingly to area bombing, which was to culminate in the horrors of Hamburg (45,400 dead), Dresden (50,000), Hiroshima (118,661), and Nagasaki (73,884). (Tallies are from The Oxford Companion to World War II.) Bombing could not produce victory except through civilian slaughter—unpalatable to people who wished to think of themselves as civilized. Indeed, it seemed, bombing could not produce victory even at that price. The mass bombing of Germany did not crush the German will or destroy (although it certainly crippled) Germany’s industrial capacity. And worse: bombing proved to be lethal not only to the bombed but to the bombers. Britain’s Bomber Command lost almost 56,000 [pilots] men in the war; American air forces, which engaged in high-risk daylight bombing, also lost almost that number.

### 2AC China Rise Inevitable

#### China rise inevitable current strategy isn’t working

Roy 9/11

(Denny Roy, Senior Research ¶ Fellow at the East-West Center, ¶ explains that “The truth is that ¶ under the ‘hegemony’ of a regional ¶ order sponsored and enforced by ¶ the United States, China's ¶ economic, technological and ¶ military rise has been virtually ¶ unabated.” “Drop the Fallacy: The United States Is Not ¶ Blocking China’s Rise” September 11, 2012 <http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/apb179_0.pdf>, TSW)

Many Chinese believe the United States is attempting to prevent China from becoming a ¶ great power that could challenge US preeminence in the Asia-Pacific region. They allege ¶ that the United States seeks to "contain" China or "check China's rise." Some analysts ¶ outside China agree. Australia's respected strategic thinker Hugh White, for example, ¶ argues in a recent Lowy Interpreter blog posting that while the US government claims to be ¶ defending international norms, in fact the "rules" of the US-enforced order include China ¶ "accepting American primacy" and "abandon[ing] its aspirations for a larger regional ¶ role." ¶ The idea that the United States will not allow China to "rise" is wrong. It is also ¶ dangerous, adding an unnecessary layer of tension into US-China relations as these two ¶ countries work through a difficult transition in the regional power structure. The truth is ¶ that under the "hegemony" of a regional order sponsored and enforced by the United ¶ States, China's economic, technological and military rise has been virtually unabated. ¶ China is becoming a great power even amidst the Chinese claim that they are being ¶ "contained." ¶ It is a preference, but not a vital interest, of the US government that China does not ¶ become either a strong military power or a rival for regional leadership. Nevertheless, ¶ Washington is not actively opposing the rise of China. The regional security order the US ¶ helped to build up and continues to maintain includes certain features that are at least ¶ partly intended to deter or defeat possible PRC uses of force in contravention of US ¶ wishes. Yet this US-led order does not prevent China from becoming a great power. ¶Economic cooperation with the United States massively increases China's wealth ¶ accumulation, economic growth and technological advancement. The United States ¶ would not and could not forcibly prevent its security partners from accommodating China ¶ and following Chinese rather than American leadership. Governments currently friendly ¶ towards the United States are free to discontinue defense cooperation, withdraw from ¶ their alliances, and evict US bases. ¶ Even if one assumes that US policy in Asia has no motive other than its own selfish ¶ promotion of US preeminence, Washington has good strategic reasons for rejecting a ¶ policy of trying to prevent the rise of China. First, other governments would not join in. ¶ All of the Asia-Pacific countries want to do business with China and none wants to ¶ unnecessarily spoil a profitable bilateral relationship. Without the support of other states, ¶ a US attempt to contain China would be untenable. Second, attempted containment ¶ would antagonize China, ensuring long-term hostility toward the United States. The US ¶ government clearly tries to avoid such antagonism whenever possible, seemingly taking to ¶ heart the notion made famous by Joseph Nye that if China is treated as an enemy, then ¶ China will become an enemy. Third, simply attempting to weaken China would create ¶ Denny Roy, Senior Research ¶ Fellow at the East-West Center, ¶ explains that “The truth is that ¶ under the ‘hegemony’ of a regional ¶ order sponsored and enforced by ¶ the United States, China's ¶ economic, technological and ¶ military rise has been virtually ¶ unabated.” ¶ Asia Paciﬁc Bulletin Asia Paciﬁc Bulletinstrategic problems rivaling those created by a super-strong China. The region remembers ¶ the Japanese invasion of China during the Pacific War and the dangerous bravado of an ¶ insecure China during the early years of CCP rule. An economic or political collapse in ¶ China would cause turmoil in the countries on China's periphery. China has recently ¶ become such a global economic engine that a Chinese downturn could threaten the ¶ underpinnings of national and regime security in other Asian states. So an outright US ¶ policy of trying to prevent China's rise would result in the worst of both worlds: China ¶ would rise anyway, and the new, stronger China would be an unambiguous adversary of ¶ the United States. ¶ In fact, it is a caricature to see US policy toward China as simply an effort to undercut a ¶ potential rival. Americans harbor two additional generations-old instincts toward China. ¶ One is to increase bilateral trade, working toward fulfilling the imagined potential of ¶ China to serve as a market for US products and services. The second is to "lift up" China ¶ by sharing what Americans see as blessings: originally Christianity, now democracy. This ¶ may be called arrogant or condescending, but it is not ill-intended, contrary to the view of ¶ some Chinese that Americans cynically use democratization as a means of weakening ¶ other states to perpetuate US domination. These US impulses to build up China coexist ¶ with fears that a burgeoning and possibly revisionist "communist" super-state might ¶ threaten the interests of the United States and its friends in the region. The result is a ¶ hybrid US policy toward China that includes deep economic engagement and ¶ encouragement of Chinese participation in multilateral institutions alongside diplomatic ¶ and military "hedging" that aims to deter China from following certain courses of action. ¶ To be sure, US strength and leadership in the region prevents the Chinese from doing ¶ everything they wish. Washington insists that a Taiwan Strait solution must have the ¶ assent of Taiwan's people and that China should not be allowed to force its will upon ¶ other claimant nations in the South China Sea territorial disputes. But neither is the ¶ United States able to fully implement its agenda because of Chinese opposition. Chinese ¶ diplomatic and economic support for North Korea, for example, thwarts US-sponsored ¶ efforts to pressure Pyongyang to turn away from its criminal behavior. On balance, even ¶ with the United States as the strongest strategic actor in the Asia-Pacific, China is already ¶ accomplishing its most important goals of economic development, increased security and ¶ enhanced leverage both within the region and globally. ¶ US policy toward China is more accommodation than containment. President George W. ¶ Bush stated in 2002 that the United States intended to keep its "military strengths beyond ¶ challenge" by any other country. Bush's Quadrennial Defense Review in 2006 outlined ¶ that the United States will "ensure that no foreign power can dictate the terms of regional ¶ or global security" and would dissuade "any military competitor from developing . . . ¶ capabilities that could enable regional hegemony or hostile action against the United States ¶ or other friendly countries." China went ahead with developing these capabilities anyway, ¶ including the DF-21D "carrier killer" anti-ship ballistic missile designed to keep US naval ¶ task forces from intervening in western Pacific military conflicts against China's wishes. ¶ Having failed to dissuade China from pursuing a massive buildup of modernized military ¶ forces, Washington changed its approach to calling on the Chinese for more ¶ "transparency" in the intentions behind this buildup. ¶ China is thriving and winning under the auspices of a regional order allegedly designed to ¶ maintain American preeminence. Indeed, the path is clear for China to gain greater ¶ regional leadership by working within the established rules if China's relative economic ¶ growth continues. Good international citizenship—demonstrated by adherence to norms ¶ widely accepted within the region, rather than aggressive pursuit of narrow Chinese ¶ interests—will enhance China's regional leadership position, while the opposite will ¶ engender resistance from regional middle and smaller powers. Ironically for its detractors, ¶ US hegemony leaves the door open for a successor and does not legitimize attempts by a ¶ decaying hegemon to hang on for too long, should that day arrive.

### Pivot impact turn

#### Pivot kills regional stability, cooperation, and triggers US-China war

**Ross ‘12**

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Even if the United States had limited its response to China’s nationalist diplomacy to improving defense ties with its maritime allies in the region, China’s leaders would not have been pleased. But those steps were necessary for U.S. security, occurred far from China’s borders, and built on the policies of previous administrations. When Washington got directly involved in China’s sovereignty disputes and increased its presence on China’s land borders, however, Beijing predictably saw this departure from past U.S. policy as gratuitous, expansionist, and threatening. As might be expected from a great power faced with a deteriorating strategic environment, China has pushed back against the pivot with concrete policies rather than the merely aggressive rhetoric it employed in the past.¶ One result has been that China has all but given up its effort to use its leverage over North Korea to get it to abandon its nuclear program. Since 2011, Beijing has substantially increased its food aid to Pyongyang, imported more of North Korea’s mineral resources, and made significant investments in North Korean mining, infrastructure, and manufacturing. China has also withdrawn its support for the six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear program, forcing Washington to pursue bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang. Meanwhile, North Korea continues to develop its nuclear weapons capability.¶ The PLA has also put pressure on those of China’s neighbors that have boosted their defense cooperation with the United States. In the spring of 2011, tensions between Beijing and Hanoi escalated as Chinese patrol ships harassed Vietnamese seismic survey boats in disputed waters, and several Chinese military officers advocated the use of force against the Vietnamese navy. Similarly, China’s maritime confrontation earlier this year with the Philippines over the contested Scarborough Shoal suggests that Beijing will push back against countries that rely on the United States to support them in sovereignty disputes. China sent combat-ready patrols to defend its claim to the shoal and, after the Philippines withdrew its ships, established a permanent presence there. Also this year, Chinese national oil companies announced unprecedented plans to drill for oil in disputed waters -- the other claimants have been active in these waters for years -- and the PLA formed a new military garrison charged with defending the country’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. Since then, China has continued to actively strengthen its presence throughout the disputed waters and islands.¶ As all these events suggest, the Obama administration’s pivot has not contributed to stability in Asia. Quite the opposite: it has made the region more tense and conflict-prone. Military aircraft and naval ships now crowd the region’s skies and waters. And the United States risks getting involved in hostilities over strategically irrelevant and economically marginal islands.¶ The pivot will be further complicated by an environment of growing nationalism, not only in China but also in Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Consider what happened in September, when anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan pressured Tokyo to purchase an island chain that both it and Beijing claim. (The territory is known in China as the Diaoyu Islands and in Japan as the Senkaku Islands.) After Tokyo’s governor, Shintaro Ishihara, who is an outspoken anti-China activist, expressed interest in buying the islands -- a move that would certainly have provoked Beijing -- the Japanese government purchased them itself, instead of simply blocking the sale. Like the Spratly Islands, these islands are of little strategic or economic value. Nonetheless, Japan’s move challenged China’s claim to the islands and provoked anti-Japanese demonstrations throughout China, sparking vandalism of Japanese businesses and government property there. This nationalist outcry led Beijing to escalate tensions with Japan. At least 14 Chinese government surveillance ships accompanied hundreds of Chinese fishing boats to the islands, where they entered Japanese-claimed territorial seas.¶ Meanwhile, China has challenged U.S. interests beyond East Asia, forsaking the cooperation that the two countries had managed to sustain in the years leading up to the pivot. Whereas between 2006 and 2010, China voted for five UN Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran, in 2012 Beijing threatened to veto sanctions on Iranian oil exports. After the United States, European countries, and Japan independently agreed to sanction Iranian oil exports in January 2012, Beijing reached new agreements with Tehran to purchase Iranian oil. What is more, Beijing has blocked Washington’s attempts to halt the bloodshed in Syria, stymying its initiatives at the UN and backing Moscow’s support for the Syrian leadership.¶ Washington’s increased activity on China’s periphery has led Beijing to conclude that the United States has abandoned strategic engagement, the cornerstone of U.S. policy toward China since the end of the Cold War. In contrast to previous administrations, the Obama administration has dismissed China’s legitimate security interests in its border regions, including even those that are not vital to U.S. security. By threatening China and challenging its sovereignty claims over symbolic territories, Washington has encouraged Chinese leaders to believe that only by adopting belligerent policies will a rising China be able to guarantee its security. Herein lies the great irony of the pivot: a strategy that was meant to check a rising China has sparked its combativeness and damaged its faith in cooperation.¶ The pivot has already damaged U.S. security interests, and the cost will only grow. If Washington continues down its current path, Chinese resistance to U.S. policies will inevitably increase, preventing bilateral cooperation on crucial issues from trade to global economic stability. The outbreak of hostilities in the region will become a real possibility, as China pushes back against the United States’ growing presence on its borders and nationalist tension rises between China and U.S. security partners over disputed but inconsequential islands.

### EU

#### Pivot hurts US-EU Coop

Steinle 1/20/13

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<http://www.fairobserver.com/article/obama-asia-tiny-pivot> ETB]

Meanwhile, the US “Pivot to Asia” has evoked various outcries from European governments; quite rightly, many leaders regard the pivot as undermining their role in the international system. In his first term, the Obama administration initiated the shift away from the decade long transatlantic relationship to the transpacific axis. The United States' engagement strategy in the Asia-Pacific region is to strengthen existing partnerships, and foster trade relations with regional countries in order to counterbalance a reemerged China and enter the regional economic rise.

#### Impact is extinction

Stivachtis 10

[Dr. Yannis. A. Stivachtis (Director of International Studies Program @ Virginia Polytechnic Institute . Professor of Poli Sci @ Virginia Polytechnic Institute & Ph.D. in Politics & International Relations from Lancaster University), THE IMPERATIVE FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION,” The Research Institute for European and American Studies, 2010,  pg. ]

There is no doubt that US-European relations are in a period of transition, and that the stresses and strains of globalization are increasing both the number and the seriousness of the challenges that confront transatlantic relations.

The events of 9/11 and the Iraq War have added significantly to these stresses and strains. At the same time, international terrorism, the nuclearization of North Korea and especially Iran, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the transformation of Russia into a stable and cooperative member of the international community, the growing power of China, the political and economic transformation and integration of the Caucasian and Central Asian states, the integration and stabilization of the Balkan countries, the promotion of peace and stability in the Middle East, poverty, climate change, AIDS and other emergent problems and situations require further cooperation among countries at the regional, global and institutional levels.

Therefore, cooperation between the U.S. and Europe is more imperative than ever to deal effectively with these problems.  It is fair to say that the challenges of crafting a new relationship between the U.S. and the EU as well as between the U.S. and NATO are more regional than global, but the implications of success or failure will be global.

### 1ar- Pivot Kills Stability/Coop

#### Pivot triggers Chinese aggression, kills regional stability, and decreases co-op

**Ross ‘12**

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Consider China’s behavior in such a light, and the risks of the pivot become obvious. The new U.S. policy unnecessarily compounds Beijing’s insecurities and will only feed China’s aggressiveness, undermine regional stability, and decrease the possibility of cooperation between Beijing and Washington. Instead of inflating estimates of Chinese power and abandoning its long-standing policy of diplomatic engagement, the United States should recognize China’s underlying weaknesses and its own enduring strengths. The right China policy would assuage, not exploit, Beijing’s anxieties, while protecting U.S. interests in the region.

**A2- Air Power**

**( ) No air power impact --**

**A. We’ve got plenty of it now.**

**Friedman and Preble 10**

(Benjamin Friedman is a research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at the Cato Institute, Christopher Preble is director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Budgetary Savings from Military Restraint, September 22, 2010 Cato Policy Analysis No. 667 September 23, 2010 <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA667.pdf>)

We would also eliminate six fighter wing equivalents from the Air Force. There are three justifications for this cut. First, **the Navy already provides enough airpower from the sea to deal with most wars**.14 Second, **the Air Force lacks enemies** that challenge its air superiority. Third, **advancements in weapons guidance greatly increased the destructive power of each airframe. These factors mean that the fighter capability we maintain is more than what is needed to support** likely ground **conflicts** or conduct bombing raids. Because we want an offshore posture rather than a forward defense, we retain our current bomber and refueling tanker procurement plans. We also maintain the Air Force’s spending on unmanned aerial vehicles, given their flexibility and low cost relative to manned aircraft.

**C. Won’t use it, public constrains, it doesn’t deter, and fails generally.**

**Eyal ’99** (Jonathan, director of studies at the Royal United Studies Institute, June 16, The Guardian, “So air power was not enough,” http://www.guardian.co.uk/Kosovo/Story/0,2763,207624,00.html)

But this is only a small part of the story. The reality is that, even for a relatively cost-free operation (at least in western lives), much consensus-building was necessary. The crisis started in earnest in February last year. Many mediation efforts ensued and many promises were accepted from the same Mr Milosevic whom everyone knew to be a liar and a cheat. Air strikes were first threatened last September, only to be aborted by a last-minute, frivolous deal which none other than the Americans - those great exponents of air power - negotiated. Ultimately, 13 months of diplomatic wriggling, hundreds of Nato council meetings, scores of UN Security Council resolutions and two “peace” conferences were required before the west went to war. Theoretically, cruise missile buttons can be pressed at will; in practice, democracies still need consent and public support, and in larger quantities than military planners may assume. The threat of air strikes did not persuade Milosevic into compromise; the deterrence effect of air power was therefore negligible. The air campaign was launched in order to avert a humanitarian disaster. Yet again, a failure: although Nato cannot be blamed for what Milosevic did to his own citizens, it is a fact that air strikes unleashed the biggest humanitarian disaster Europe has known since 1945. Nato’s involvement merely meant that this disaster happened much more quickly and that, at least theoretically, it is now reversible if the refugees chose to return home. The Yugoslav episode may make democracies more willing to confront dictators. However, as the complications of the last few days indicate, it is premature to conclude that future confrontations can be conducted only from the air, or that they carry negligible risks. In short, the armchair generals still have their uses.

**A2- Air Power – Extensions: High Now**

**( ) US dominates airpower now**

**CSM ‘4** (Christian Science Monitor, January 15, p. Lexis)

Today, no other country comes close to US air power. It was not lost on Pentagon strategists (or the rest of the world) that US Air Force B-2 stealth bombers were able to take off from their base in Missouri, cruise to targets in Afghanistan and Iraq, deliver their deadly payloads, and fly back home without ever stopping. The US dominates the skies to a far greater degree than Roman legions controlled the ground or the British fleet ruled the seas.

 **( ) Air power alone fails**

**Kelly ‘2** (Michael, editor of the Atlantic Monthly, April, The Atlantic Monthly, “The Air-Power Revolution,” <http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2002/04/kelly.htm>)

After America’s first failed war, then, the view on air power that had arisen from World War II was only—powerfully—confirmed. In an effort far more ambitious than that during World War II, and even given great advances in U.S. technology, bombing had once again proved to be indecisive. War could not be won by air alone. Air power could not break an enemy. Depending on air power could only delude generals into throwing more lives into a lost cause on the ground. Any attempt to use air power on the scale required to win a war necessitated a level of slaughter that a civilized democracy would su pport only when national survival itself was at stake.